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Abstract 
Repeated action can be more or less under habitual control, depending on how often it has been 
repeated, how complex it is, and how stable the context is. We propose that in situations where 
behavior is somewhat habitual but still flexible, repeated action can be modified by self-talk 
questions: Instead of a direct cue-behavior association, the situation may lead people to ask 
themselves a question, which then prompts action. Across three studies, participants showed 
below-baseline rates of behavior repetition when they were presented with the negative question 
“Which one should I not choose?”. In contrast, people tended to repeat their behavior above 
baseline levels when they were presented with the affirmative question “Which one should I 
choose?”. In Experiment 3, this effect vanished when repetition was explicitly requested, 
providing evidence for our hypothesis that self-talk most effectively guides behavior when 
behavior is still flexible. 
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Imagine you’re at a buffet and you have to pick either coffee or tea as a drink. Which one 
should you choose? If you are a regular coffee drinker, coffee is probably the first response that 
comes to mind. But what if you asked yourself a different question? Would an unfamiliar 
question such as “Which one should you not choose?” disrupt your coffee habit? In this thesis, 
we propose that people naturally ask themselves questions when a choice is required and that 
these questions can alter established behaviors. 
Previous work on repeated action has emphasized an automatic cue-response association. 
Indeed, an influential definition of habits includes the assertion that “contexts activate habitual 
responses directly, without the mediation of goal states.” (Wood & Neal, 2007, p. 843). It seems 
self-evident that this is the case for short, well-defined actions that are repeated in a stable 
setting, such as pulling the brakes while driving or locking the door when one leaves the house. 
However, many repeated actions in daily life occur in much more variable situations and require 
variable behavior. Choosing coffee over tea can occur in a friend’s home, in a coffee shop, or at 
a breakfast buffet and the choice may need to be expressed by verbally stating a preference, by 
pointing to one option, or by reaching for one of the beverages. 
Although it seems likely that these varied behaviors happen efficiently, it is unlikely that 
they are completely fixed patterns cued by the context. This possibility is especially likely when 
the behaviors occur in varied contexts that are unlikely to share many cues, cue-dependency is 
unlikely to be completely responsible for stable patterns of behavior. Instead, the environment 
may prompt implicit verbal utterances that cue the behavior. None of this is new, as previous 
work states clearly that there is a continuum of habitual control (Neal, Wood, Labrecque, & 
Lally, 2012; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003; Wood & Rünger, 2016), but in practice the middle area 
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of this continuum has not received sufficient research attention. The idea of habits developing 
gradually is also supported by findings from cognitive neuropsychology. During habit 
acquisition, neural activation shifts from a network that is associated with deliberate control, the 
associative cortico-basal ganglia loop, to a network that is associated with automatic and 
efficient behavior, the sensorimotor cortico-basal ganglia loop (Wood & Rünger, 2016; Yin & 
Knowlton, 2006). There is evidence that this shift does not occur linearly, but instead varies 
across low, medium, and high levels of habitual control. Tricomi, Balleine, and O’Doherty 
(2009) trained a group of participants in a self-paced button-press task in 12 sessions that were 
spaced across three days. They found that task-related activity in regions of the basal ganglia that 
belong to the sensorimotor loop increased across the training sessions, but not monotonously. 
Specifically, although on average training effects did carry over across the three days, in the first 
one or two sessions of each new day participants showed brain activation that suggested a 
resurgence of goal-directed control. These findings suggest that the degree of habitual control 
over a behavior can not only increase with practice, but also decrease with factors such as time. 
Similarly, applied behavioral work has reported resurgences of attentional control and deliberate 
verbal self-instructions even in highly practiced behaviors (e.g., Geeves, McIlwain, Sutton, & 
Christensen, 2014; Jenkins, 2007; Toner & Moran, 2014).  
Other work has documented the role of automaticity in habitual behavior (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000; Wood & Neal, 2007). Far from contesting the existence of automaticity in 
habits, we aim to point out that different behaviors at different levels of habitual control may 
show some, but not all features of automaticity (Bargh, 1994; Moors & Houwer, 2006; Shiffrin 
& Schneider, 1977) and that the automaticity need not lie in direct cue-behavior associations. For 
instance, making coffee may be a very efficient behavior and will be executed from start to finish 
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once initiated, but the actor is fully aware of the process and its initiation may still require 
attentional control. Instead of a direct cue-behavior association, the cue may automatically 
prompt a verbal decision process which then leads to behavior. The flexibility that is required in 
many everyday situations may lie in the verbal decision and that decision could then trigger an 
automatized behavior. In this way, self-directed language can integrate flexibility and efficiency. 
This perspective is in line with hierarchical accounts of the relation between goals and habits 
(Dezfouli & Balleine, 2012, 2013). In this thesis, we propose a process that guides action in 
situations in which behavior is neither entirely guided by deliberate effortful processing nor 
entirely guided by environmental cues. In other words, we are interested in situations where 
behavior is well-trained and efficient, but retains some flexibility. 
Verbal thought could be one intervening mechanism when behavior is somewhat but not 
fully rigid. Specifically, we propose that asking oneself questions can modulate repeated action. 
Self-talk, defined as an ongoing dialogue with oneself (Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015; 
Dolcos, Wilson, Sánchez, Zell, & Albarracín, 2016), has been linked to sports performance 
(Hardy, 2006), responses to stress (Kross et al., 2014), and task performance (Dolcos & 
Albarracín, 2014). People also strategically use self-talk to break existing habits (Quinn, Pascoe, 
Wood, & Neal, 2010). In this thesis, we linked different self-talk questions to decision making. 
When making a choice, self-asking questions like “Should I do this?” or “Which one should I 
choose?” is likely natural. These questions are parallel to those described in the situated 
inference model (Loersch & Payne, 2011): In this model, it is assumed that a given situation 
affords a certain question which is then answered using accessible information. For example, 
meeting a new person could afford the question “What kind of person is this?”, and if a previous 
prime has made kindness-related information accessible, this will likely be used to answer the 
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question. In our work, we assume that habitual behavior can similarly serve as accessible 
information in answering self-posed questions. If an action has been repeated sufficiently often 
to establish a response tendency, the most likely answer to “Which one should I choose?” is the 
option that has been chosen before. This prediction implies that such a question makes repetition 
of previous behaviors likely. If people’s normal thought processes resemble this sequence, then 
experimentally presenting such a natural question during a decision-making process should 
either have no effect: It’s identical to what people would do anyway. Alternatively, it could 
facilitate the performance of repeated behaviors: If the cue-behavior association is not yet strong 
enough to lead to perfect repetition by itself, adding such an affirmative question might reinforce 
the tendency to choose a previously chosen option, as evidenced by professional musicians and 
athletes who report using verbal self-instructions to improve their performance of even highly 
learned behaviors (Geeves et al., 2014; Jenkins, 2007; Toner & Moran, 2014). In contrast, a 
question like “Which one should I not choose?” that is less likely to spring to mind naturally and 
invites rethinking a prior choice might disrupt the performance of the repeated behavior. In this 





The goal of this study was to provide evidence for the effect of questions on repeated 
behavior. We chose a one-factor within-subjects design and compared an affirmative question, 
“Which one should I choose?”, that we assumed to be something that people would naturally ask 
themselves in a choice situation, with a corresponding negative question, “Which one should I 
not choose?”, and with a no-question condition. 
Method 
Forty-three participants were recruited from the paid community participant pool of the 
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School and received $5 in compensation. The sample 
included 27 women (63%) and 16 men (37%) and participants were between 18 and 65 years 
old, M = 25.49, SD = 11.44. Participants reported their race as follows: 33% Caucasian, 30% 
Asian, 26% African American, 9% Hispanic or Latino, and 2% selected the “other” category. 
The majority of participants (86%) reported that English was their first language. To reduce the 
effect of trials where participants did not consider their response at all, considered it in too much 
detail, or took too long because they were momentarily not paying attention, trials with reaction 
times under 200 ms or over 3500 ms were excluded, which resulted in the removal of 7% of all 
trials. In all three experiments, results did not change when all trials were included. 
We developed a choice task to train repeated behavior in the lab. The task had four steps 
(see Figure 1): First, participants saw pictures of three identical doors labeled ‘left’, ‘center’, and 
                                                 1 The first two experiments were conducted by Christopher Jones and Dolores 
Albarracín. The third experiment and all reported analyses of the three studies were conducted 
by Sophie Lohmann. 
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‘right’. Pressing the ‘l’, ‘c’, or ‘r’ keys led to choosing one of the doors, revealing the picture of 
an animal. There were four sets of doors, each distinguished by a different background color, 
resulting in a total of 12 animal pictures. In the first phase, participants saw each set of doors 10 
times and their task was to learn the locations of the pictures. For example, for the doors with the 
orange background, there was a picture of a dog behind the left door, a picture of a cat behind the 
center door, and a picture of a hamster behind the right door. 
 In the second phase, participants chose their favorite picture for each set of doors. For 
example, someone might prefer and thus select the orange door with the hamster picture behind 
the right door. In the third step (training phase), participants saw the same pictures of doors and 
were trained to choose their favorite pictures over and over again. For example, whenever they 
saw the orange set of doors, the study would not continue until they had chosen the right door 
which was hiding the hamster. They saw each set of doors 30 times, resulting in 120 trials. In the 
fourth step (test phase), participants were informed that they were now free to choose any doors 
they wanted to. Before each set of doors, they saw one of three additional screens (within-
subjects) for 2000 ms: A blank screen that served as no-question baseline, the question “Which 
one should I choose?” as an affirmative question, or “Which one should I not choose?” as a 
negative question. Next, one of the four sets of doors appeared and participants had to choose 
one of the doors. Participants were asked to read the questions as if they were saying them to 
themselves and to use them in decision making: “If you see a question, please ask it to yourself 
to make your choice. It is of the utmost importance that you read these questions as if talking to 
yourself as they appear.” These instructions were designed to make participants pay attention and 
to ensure that they would parallel the experience of self-talk. Each combination of question type 
and set of doors was presented 10 times, resulting in 120 trials. Finally, participants answered 
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questions on their gender, race and ethnicity, participation in previous experiments, age, native 
language and English skills, and problems that occurred. The experiment was programmed in 
MediaLab and DirectRT (Jarvis, 2010a, 2010b). We recorded how quickly participants 
responded and how often they continued to choose their favorite pictures in the test phase 
(proportion of repeated behavior). For all three studies, we report all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures in the studies (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the door choice paradigm. The key assignment for 
choosing pictures was "L" for the left door, "C" for the center door, and "R" for the right door. 
The examples show the no-question condition and the affirmative-question condition. 
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Results 
The proportion of repeated action in the no question condition was 49% (see Table 1). 
This level is above the chance mark of 33% but is well below 100%. Thus, this level of repetition 
is indicative of a response tendency that is pronounced enough to guide behavior but not strong 
enough to completely restrain deviations from the response pattern. In other words, this pattern 
represents exactly the case of moderate habitual control that we expected to be optimal for self-
talk to guide behavior. 
Table 1 
Average Proportions of Repeated Behavior in All Studies, with Standard Deviations in 
Parentheses. 
Question Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
   Free choice Repetition instruction None .49 (.50) .59 (.49) .46 (.50) .90 (.30) 
Affirmative .62 (.49) .71 (.45) .52 (.50) .89 (.31) 
Negative .19 (.40) .30 (.46) .33 (.47) .84 (.36) 
Irrelevant – .47 (.50) .43 (.49) .88 (.33) 
 
A multi-level logit regression with repeated choice (0: other picture than the previously 
chosen favorite, 1: favorite picture) as the dependent variable and random intercepts for 
participants resulted in a main effect of question, χ2(2) = 684.65, p < .001. The model 
coefficients adjusted for multiple testing showed that the affirmative question was associated 
with higher levels of repeated action than the no-question baseline, OR = 1.72, 95% CI [1.46, 
2.03], p < .001, see Table 1. We calculated the difference between how often participants 
repeated their actions in the affirmative condition and in the no-question condition for each 
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participant separately and found that this score was bigger than zero for 79% of participants. 
That means that the effect we observed across participants was also present in 79% of individual 
participants and not just driven by a small number of individuals. In contrast, the negative 
question was associated with lower levels of repeated action than the baseline, OR = 0.23, 95% 
CI [0.19, 0.28], p < .001. Analyzing the difference score between repeated action in the negative 
versus no-question conditions, we found that all but four participants showed this effect (91%). 
Discussion 
These results indicated that different questions can influence degree of continuity in 
repeated action. In particular, reading the affirmative question “Which one should I choose?” 
made people more likely to repeat their past behavior. This finding is in line with the hypothesis 
that when the cue-behavior association in the baseline condition is not highly fixed, the cue-
behavior association plus the question facilitates behavior repetition more than the cue-behavior 
association by itself. Also, as expected, the negative question “Which one should I not choose?” 
disrupted the repetition of previous behavior to below-chance levels. It could, however, be 
argued that the training phase was too short to truly start the shift from effortful to automatic 
responding in any of the conditions. In addition, this experiment only compared two questions 
and thus allows only limited conclusions about what kinds of questions are effective. To address 
these issues, we conducted the next study.2 
  
                                                 




In Experiment 2 we examined whether the observed effects could be obtained with any 
question regardless of content. This study had a one-factor within-subjects design (no question, 
affirmative question, negative question, irrelevant question). The newly introduced irrelevant 
question was “What should I have for dinner?”. We recruited N = 55 participants from the paid 
community participant pool of the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School participated in 
exchange for $5. Thirty-three participants were female (60%) and 22 were male (40%); 40% 
were Asian, 27% Caucasian, 20% African American, 9% Hispanic or Latino, and 4% selected 
the “other” category. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 49, M = 22.76, SD = 5.47. Eighty-two 
percent of participants reported that English was their first language. Trials with reaction times 
below 200 ms or above 3500 ms were excluded, which resulted in the removal of 6% of all trials. 
To ensure that all participants gained a degree of automaticity in responding, we 
increased the number of trials in the training phase from 30 trials (as in Experiment 1) to 50 trials 
per set of doors and included a short breather break in the middle. To keep the sessions short 
despite this increase in trials, we did not include the blue set of doors used in Experiment 1. 
Further, we added a fixation prompt after each question to ensure that our previous results could 
not just be explained by the questions drawing more visual attention to the doors than the blank 
screen in the no-question condition. Otherwise, the design was identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
A multi-level logit regression with repeated choice (0: other picture than the previously 
chosen favorite, 1: favorite picture) as the dependent variable and random intercepts for 
participants resulted in a main effect of question, χ2(2) = 698.14, p < .001. All contrasts were 
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corrected for multiple testing. The effects found in the first two studies were replicated: People 
repeated their choices more often under the affirmative question than under the no-question 
baseline, OR = 1.80, 95% CI [1.48, 2.20], p < .001, and 64% of individual participants showed 
this effect. Under the negative question, people repeated their choices less often, OR = 0.22, 95% 
CI [0.18, 0.27], p < .001, 71% of individual participants showed this effect. The irrelevant 
question was also associated with below-baseline levels of repeated action, OR = 0.55, 95% CI 
[0.46, 0.67], p < .001, but this effect was comparatively small and not nearly as pronounced as 
that of the negative question. The irrelevant and negative questions were statistically different, 
OR = 2.52, 95% CI [2.04, 3.10], p < .001. 
Discussion 
As in the previous study, the affirmative question was associated with higher levels of 
repeated action than no question at all. Again, the negative question was associated with lower 
levels of repeated action compared to no question at all. Responses to the newly introduced 
irrelevant question did not mimic the responses of either the affirmative or the negative question, 
suggesting that the questions need to be thematically related to the choice to have the identified 
effects. In both studies presented so far, participants were explicitly instructed to use the 
questions in making their choice. It is thus possible that the obtained results are an artifact of 
these directions. Therefore, we removed these directions in the next study. In addition, we 
wanted to test the hypothesis that the self-talk questions are most effective when behavior is 





The next experiment varied the instructional set that participants received. We 
hypothesized that people who were free to choose any picture they wanted to would be affected 
by the questions as in the previous studies, whereas people who were instructed to keep repeating 
their choices would not be as affected by the questions. Participants were recruited from the 
psychology participant pool at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and received 
course credits as compensation. We aimed to collect 60 participants per condition and scheduled 
more than that because we wanted to run full sessions. We ended up with N = 125 for whom both 
information on their favorites and on their test phase choices was available, 60 participants in the 
free-choice condition and 65 participants in the instructed repetition condition. The final sample 
included 73% women and 27% men and was comprised of young adults from 18 to 25, M = 
19.46 years, SD = 1.33. The race and ethnicity composition was as follows: 58.4% Asian, 28% 
White, 7.2% Latino, Latina or Hispanic, 2.4% Black, 1.6% Middle Eastern, North African, or 
Arab American, and 2.4% other. The majority of respondents reported self-talking only in 
English or in English and other languages (66%; only n = 59 participants answered this question) 
and 52.8% of participants reported that English was their first language. 
We manipulated instructional set by restricting participants’ freedom of choice: For the 
group with free-choice instructions the experiment was the same as in the previous study and 
they were explicitly told that they were free to choose any door they wanted to in the test phase. 
For the group with repetition instructions the test phase instructions stated that “Your task is to 
continue choosing the door that you picked in Part 2. ... Remember that you are supposed to keep 
choosing the doors that you picked as your preferred ones.” This study had a 2 (free-choice 
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instruction, repetition instruction; between-subjects) x 4 (no question, affirmative question, 
negative question, irrelevant question; within-subjects) design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to the between-subject condition.  
In addition, participants were no longer instructed to use the questions in making their 
choice. We wanted to test if the effects we observed in the first two studies were truly effects of 
simply reading the questions, and not just of being instructed to say them to oneself or of demand 
effects. Instead of reading instructions to ask the question as if talking to themselves, participants 
in this experiment read the following: 
Please use these questions as a fixation point (i.e., look at them). Typically, researchers 
just use an “x” as a fixation point, but we want to test a theory saying that different 
stimuli may improve attention. We vary the formats and trials to sample different 
conditions under which learning occurs. The questions are taken from another study and 
are not related to your task in this study. ... Remember, the questions are just there to 
focus your visual attention, they are not directions. 
The key assignment was changed from “l”, “c”, and “r” for left, center, and right doors to “1”, 
“2”, and “3” to reflect the order of the doors on the keyboard so that participants could respond 
more efficiently. The irrelevant question was changed to “What should I do this weekend?” to 
assess the effect of a different irrelevant question and because of comments that combining 
“What should I have for dinner?” with various animals like cats, dolphins, or geckos could be 
seen as slightly macabre. A suspicion check and items on how difficult and confusing the study 
was and the language that participants usually rely on for self-talk were added to the 
demographics section. We included the blue doors again and did not include the fixation prompt. 
All other procedures were identical to Experiment 2. Trials on which participants took less than 
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200 ms or longer than 3500 ms to respond were excluded, which removed 5% of all trials. One 
trial on which a participant made no response at all was excluded. 
Results 
A multi-level logit regression with repeated choice (0: other picture than the previously 
chosen favorite, 1: favorite picture) as the dependent variable and participant as a random 
grouping factor for the intercept resulted in a main effect of question, χ2(3) = 185.66, p < .001, 
and a main effect of condition, χ2(1) = 83.25, p < .001. These main effects were qualified by a 
question x condition interaction, χ2(3) = 13.00, p = .005. Contrasts adjusted for multiple tests 
revealed that in the free-choice condition, the affirmative question was associated with higher 
levels of repeated action than the no-question baseline, OR = 1.34, 95% CI [1.14, 1.57], p < .001, 
whereas the negative question was associated with lower levels of repeated action than the 
baseline, OR = 0.53, 95% CI [0.45, 0.63], p < .001. In the repetition instruction condition, the 
difference between the affirmative question and the baseline was not significant, OR = 0.87, 95% 
CI [0.67, 1.13], p = .526. In contrast, the negative question was still associated with lower levels 
of repeated action than the baseline, OR = 0.48, 95% CI [0.38, 0.62], p < .001. 
Next, we evaluated how many individual participants showed the expected effects. In the 
free-choice condition, 63% of participants chose their favorite pictures less often in the negative 
question than in the no question condition and 55% chose their favorite pictures less often in the 
no question condition than in the affirmative question condition. In the repetition instruction 
condition, 42% of participants chose their favorite pictures less often in the negative question 
than in the no question condition, but only 31% chose their favorite pictures more often in the 
affirmative question condition than in the no question condition. 
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Discussion 
When participants were free to choose, the results are the same as in the first three 
studies: The affirmative question has a facilitating effect on the performance of repeated action 
and the negative question has a disrupting effect. The same effect of the negative question 
occurred when people’s choices were constrained by the instructions. In contrast, the facilitating 
effect of the affirmative question disappeared in that condition. It should be noted that the base 
rate in the repetition instruction condition was very high and might have led to a ceiling effect. In 
conclusion, self-talk questions may have the strongest effect when people’s choice actually 
matters as opposed to there being one objectively correct answer and when the base rate of 




Across three experiments, we showed that exposing people to questions influences their 
choices in repeated situations. These effects are strongest when the questions are relevant to the 
choice at hand. These effects occur whether the questions are presented as instructions to be 
followed or as distractors to be ignored. Finally, we showed that the effects of the questions are 
diminished when personal freedom of deliberation is reduced by the instructions. 
Showing people the affirmative question “Which one should I choose?” on a screen made 
them more likely to repeat past behavior; showing them the question “Which one should I not 
choose?” made people less likely to repeat past behavior. There are several possible reasons for 
this pattern. First, participants may have interpreted the questions as instructions telling them to 
indicate to the experimenter which one they should or should not choose. To discourage 
participants from this interpretation, in Experiment 3 we informed participants that the questions 
were not instructions and that they should not, in fact, use them. This change had no effect on 
how the questions affected behavior. Second, merely reading the word “not” in the negative 
question might have functioned as a stop signal, making participants stop the execution of the 
most salient behavior. The more complex sentence structure may have been irrelevant. This, 
however, would not explain why the affirmative question increased rates of repeated behavior 
compared to baseline. Third, participants may have adopted the questions as a form of self-talk 
merely by reading them. This self-talk would then influence decision making. Relevant questions 
that people may not typically ask themselves could draw the decision making process away from 
its usual route. This would explain the lower rate of repeated behavior in the negative question 
condition. The third explanation can be tested more directly in future research: Observing 
people’s natural self-talk in choice situations and experimentally manipulating which questions 
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are natural in a given situation will give more insight in how posing oneself questions affects 
behavior.  
The effectiveness of self-talk questions seems to depend on the base rate of behavior 
repetition and on how much behavior variability is allowed by the circumstances. Repeated 
behavior happens on a continuum ranging from completely flexible choices that are guided by 
deliberate decisions to completely rigid habits that are guided by context cues. In Experiment 3, 
instructions that allowed less flexibility reduced the impact of the questions compared to 
instructions in a control condition and in the first three experiments, which allowed participants 
freedom of choice. Future work can test this hypothesis further by comparing habits of differing 
strengths: Given a stable context, a behavior that has been repeated more often should fall higher 
on the deliberate choice-habit continuum and be less affected by the questions than the same 
behavior that has been practiced less often. 
We have proposed self-talk questions as a mechanism that can guide action when 
behavior has been practiced often enough to be considered a weak habit but still retains 
flexibility. The results of our studies show that depending on the type of question, this self-talk 
can increase or decrease the proportion of habitual action as long as the questions are relevant to 
the decision-making process. This intermediate verbal step between cues and behavior thus 
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